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Erasing the Ketchaoua Mosque
Catholicism, assimilation, and civic identity in France  
and Algeria
Ralph Ghoche 
“Touche pas à mon église” (“Don’t touch my church”) reads the cover of the July 
2015 issue of Valeurs actuelles, a French conservative news magazine. The slogan, 
and the movement that it sparked, were devised in response to comments made 
by Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris Grand Mosque, in a televised interview 
a month earlier. Asked whether disused churches in France could be transformed 
into mosques, Boubakeur had paused momentarily and answered: “Why not? It is 
the same God. The rites are similar, fraternal. I think that Muslims and Christians 
can coexist.”1 The reply generated controversy, as it seemed to feed conspirac-
ist suspicions, fueled by the growing power of identitarian movements, that a 
grander cultural displacement of the white, Christian population by Arab Muslims 
was underway.2 So fierce was the backlash that Boubakeur published a retraction 
soon after the interview.3
The author of the Valeurs actuelles article, Denis Tillinac — though himself a 
conservative Catholic — performed some masterly sleights of hand as he shifted 
the ground of debate from religion to cultural values, from Christianity to such 
French Republican convictions as secularism and freedom of speech. He spoke of 
churches less as objects of Christian worship than as sites for the preservation of 
national identity, rooted in cultural landscapes and historical memory. The slogan 
“Don’t touch my church” too was deceptive and calculated as it co-opted the 
famous anti-racist slogan “Touche pas à mon pote” (“Don’t touch my buddy”) 
that issued from marches in the mid-1980s condemning a wave of race-based 
violence against adolescents of North African descent residing in France. Tillinac 
included a petition with the article, and while it garnered 25,000 signatures within 
a day, its first signatory attracted the most attention: the center-right former pres-
ident Nicolas Sarkozy.4 Indeed, the issue gained popular support and cut across 
political lines in France; polling revealed that sixty-seven percent of the public were 
supportive of measures that restrict the conversion of churches into mosques.5
What is the neocolonial present? The debate over the conversion of churches 
into mosques in France, not to say the veritable restrictions over the construc-
tion of minarets and new mosques in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, point to a 
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renewed backlash against more inclusive models of European citizenship advanced 
in prior decades. Indeed, in recent years, the heads of state of France (Sarkozy), UK 
(David Cameron), Germany (Angela Merkel), and Spain (José Maria Aznar) have all 
proclaimed the failure of multiculturalism. While politicians may declare the end 
of multicultural policies — policies that most governments in Europe have never 
instituted nor endorsed — the multicultural reality of life in Europe’s urban centers 
is more difficult to deny.6 In France, where multiculturalism has been treated with 
significant antipathy across the political spectrum, the visibility of ethnic and racial 
minorities on the “street” is not reflected in the nation’s laws and constitution. 
Indeed, French legislators have tended to set citizenship against personal identity, 
and have asserted republican values over and against the recognition of minority 
groups.7 For example, Article 1 of the French constitution has pitted the “equal-
ity of all citizens before the law” against any “distinction of origin, race or reli-
gion” since 1946, thus rendering these minority distinctions juridically invisible.8 
As Achille Mbembe has explained, “the perverse effect of this indifference to 
difference is thus the relative indifference to discrimination.”9
In the wake of the professed failure of multiculturalism, prominent politicians 
and scholars have urged that we return to an idea with a long and fraught history: 
assimilation.10 Those, like Sarkozy, who have sought to rehabilitate the term, stress 
the responsibility of immigrants and their descendants to demonstrate their public 
attachment to French values while suppressing their cultural and religious herit-
age or relegating them to the private sphere. Attempts to rebrand the concept 
of assimilation run parallel to recent governmental efforts at curtailing discus-
sion of France’s colonial legacy.11 Indeed, issues of minority visibility and cultural 
integration always seem to come back to the question of colonialism. Once the 
byword for colonial policies of cultural violence, mechanisms of assimilation in the 
nineteenth century aimed to erase the socio-religious identities of colonial sub-
jects and absorb them into French singularity. But if these policies were previously 
directed at colonial subjects located on territory d’outre-mer, that is to say, beyond 
Continental Europe, discussions of assimilation today have centered on citizens 
and permanent residents of mainland France.
This chapter looks back to the French colony of Algeria in the opening 
decades of the modern colonial era, in the period between 1830, the year of 
France’s conquest of Algiers, to 1870, just before the consolidation and mass 
colonization of Algeria under the government of the Third Republic.12 It was dur-
ing these years that the modern concept of colonialist assimilation was forged. 
If the question of assimilation today has run parallel to debates on visible mark-
ers of Islam in the public sphere, in nineteenth-century Algiers assimilationist 
policies also helped forge the architectural identity of the city. As with today’s 
debates over the  consensual conversion of disused churches, forcible conver-
sion emerged as a key tactic by French administrators to reshape urban life in 
colonial Algeria. Indeed, between 1830 and 1862, buildings serving Muslim reli-
gious needs in occupied Algeria were reduced from 172 to 47.13 In Algiers alone, 
at least three of its five Catholic churches, including the Cathedral of Algiers 
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(formerly the Ketchaoua Mosque), were housed in mosques that had been 
expropriated.14
What is clear is that architecture has always been an important instrument in 
the process of framing citizenship and identity. This is something that the “Touche 
pas à mon église” movement knows all too well. Indeed, a close reading of Tillinac’s 
polemic shows that it centers, above all else, on the fear that the re-signification 
of churches into mosques would have a disruptive effect on national culture. In 
other words, at the very center of these debates is the concern that architecture 
might come to represent a differentiated form of citizenship rather than reproduce 
majoritarian norms, practices, and traditions, some long since eroded of meaning.
ARCHITECTURE AND ASSIMILATION
If Tillinac’s movement today has insisted on the relative historical purity of France’s 
architectural heritage as a way of enforcing cultural integration, an altogether 
different tactic was introduced in nineteenth-century Algeria in order to ensure 
the “pacification” and submission of the Algerian population: architectural hybrid-
ity and eclecticism. Even the famous neo-Gothic architect, Eugène-Emmanuel 
Viollet-le-Duc, who waged a long campaign to uphold a purified account of the 
rise of the Gothic that was free of foreign influences, transformed his architec-
tural vocabulary in a radical way in Algeria, where he infused his design for a 
commemorative monument with stylistic idioms drawn from Islamic and North 
African architectures.15 In fact, Viollet-le-Duc went further in his bid to see colonial 
Algeria populated by architectural hybrids. As architecte des Édifices diocésains, 
he appointed students from the most radically eclectic atelier in Paris, the atelier of 
Simon-Claude Constant-Dufeux, to head major church building projects in Algiers.
In the hands of the Catholic Church, architectural eclecticism emerged in 
mid-nineteenth-century Algiers as a style of forcible assimilation, one geared 
towards France’s new expansionist footing.16 Style in the nineteenth century was 
an intensely political and ideological phenomenon. In France, Romantic archi-
tects erected buildings with hybrid conjunctions of styles as a way to convey their 
sense of history’s past and future trajectory. Buildings such as Henri Labrouste’s 
Sainte-Geneviève Library, for example, portrayed France as the rightful heir of 
the westward migration of knowledge from Asia Minor, to Greece and Rome.17 
Visitors moved through the pre-classical entrance hall, up the Renaissance stair-
case and into the modern, iron-supported reading room; in other words, as they 
moved through physical and geographical space, they also proceeded through 
 historical time.
Transplanted to Algerian soil, the worldview that animated Romantic 
 architects — and produced some of Paris’ most celebrated landmarks — would 
serve as a mandate for the appropriation and destruction of the cultural heritage 
of a people. Romantic architects looked at the territory as a zone of experimen-
tation to test their architectural formulations for a healthy social order, even as 
these dominated or excluded the existing populations. The buildings they erected 
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recombined architectural elements in such a way as to validate France’s expansion 
into North Africa, a conquest that was based on the premise of bringing civili-
zation back to its original cradle in the “Orient.”18 Here was an architecture of 
assimilation, in so far as it aimed to absorb and integrate the architectural heritage 
of Algeria — as foreign and alien as it might have been — into the consummate 
body of French identity.
Scholars have seen the practice of incorporating local and Arabic building 
forms into French colonial architecture as a phenomenon that emerged in the late 
nineteenth century and culminated in the rise of the so-called “Style Jonnart.” 
The style was named after the governor general of Algeria, Charles Jonnart, who 
mandated the use of néo-mauresque elements in the design of public buildings 
in the first decade of the twentieth century. At first glance, the néo- mauresque 
buildings in Algeria appear to operate as reconciliatory images, elaborate and 
alluring displays suggesting the co-existence of two cultures: French and Algerian. 
This is the way they have tended to be interpreted. In Arabisances, an exhaustive 
study of néo-mauresque architecture in North Africa, François Béguin located 
the origins of such stylistic hybrids in the 1865 Arab kingdom policy of Napoleon 
III  (r.1852–70) and in the new conservationist ethos of the Second Empire. The 
process of “arabization” of colonial architecture, therefore, reflected an inter-
est in presenting France’s “protecting” and “paternal” influence in the colonies, 
which led to new attempts to safeguard “ancestral forms of habitat and urban 
customs” and marked a shift from “armies and wars” to “political and psycho-
logical action.”19
Some fifty years before Jonnart’s policies were put into effect, however, the 
Catholic Church, working in conjunction with Romantic architects, spearheaded 
the deployment of such architectural hybrids in Algiers. Buildings such as Saint-
Philippe Cathedral, the Bishop’s palace, the Great Seminary at Kouba, and the 
Basilica of Notre-Dame d’Afrique were among the first colonial edifices in Algeria 
to integrate elements drawn from building traditions in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Islamic Iberia [Figure 5.1]. Arguably the spate of religious buildings 
erected in Algiers in the mid-nineteenth century complicates the view that the 
introduction of arabizing elements into French colonial architecture served as con-
ciliatory gestures. Looked at through the lens of the assimilationist theories of the 
age, particularly those propagated by church figures in Algeria, the reading proves 
as deceptive as it is dangerous.
Assimilation, as a set of practices and policies in French colonial history, 
has complex history. Most scholars chart the prevalence of assimilationist pol-
icies in French colonies as running parallel to the extent to which governmen-
tal administrations adhered to republican values. Modern assimilationist ideas 
emerged with the rise of Enlightenment ideals and were first applied as state pol-
icy by the National Convention a few years after the Revolution of 1789.20 These 
policies were curtailed significantly during Napoleonic rule and the Bourbon 
Restoration although the “spirit of assimilation” remained among certain seg-
ments of the government leading to the introduction of modest assimilationist 
91
Erasing the Ketchaoua Mosque
policies during the liberal constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe (r.1830–48).21 
With the Republican revolution of 1848, assimilationist policies resurfaced in 
a much more overt way, most notably with the Constitution of November 4, 
1848 which stated  that the colonies were an integral part of French territory. 
The constitution led to the division of Algeria into three departments (Alger, 
Oran and Constantine) with representatives elected to the French parliament.22 
Policy shifted again  during the last decade of the Second Empire, in this case 
toward a new colonial ideal, albeit a contradictory one, which purported to 
respect the institutions of native Algerians while supporting the gradual accultur-
ation of Algerians to French social norms.23 “France has not come to destroy the 
nationality of a  people,” Napoleon III exclaimed on his tour of Algiers in 1865. 
Addressing Algerians directly, he continued: “I want to increase your well-being, 
include you more and more in the ruling of your country as well as the benefits 
of civilization.”24
In comparison to the fluctuating levels of governmental interest in institut-
ing assimilationist policies in Algeria during the nineteenth century, the Catholic 
Church wavered little in its resolve to assimilate the Algerian population. In private 
channels, Church leaders employed the established term for such practices: reli-
gious conversion. In more public forums, however, terms like “assimilation” and 
“education” were used to convey the same message in a veiled way. The duplicity 
was the result of a prohibition on proselytizing to non-Christians by the Minister 
of War in Paris, which administered religious affairs in Algeria until 1848. The parts 
of Algeria that were “pacified” in the first dozen years of French rule were rela-
tively small and largely urban, and French administrators sought to quell tensions 
with inhabitants. Moreover, anti-clericalism still pervaded military ranks during 
the July Monarchy.25 The first bishop of Algiers, Antoine-Louis-Adolphe Dupuch, 
Figure 5.1
The Church of Notre 
Dame d’Afrique (Our 
Lady of Africa), Algiers 
(Jean-Eugène Fromageau, 
1872). Photograph c.1880. 
Source: Jean Geiser, 
“Notre Dame d’Afrique,” 
in Souvenir d’Algérie 
(c.1880) [Getty Institute].
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was forced to resign in 1845 as a result of his missionary zeal, which had put him 
somewhat at odds with the Minister of War, and especially with Thomas Bugeaud, 
the governor general of Algeria.
The Algerian Church was still in its infancy when Dupuch was obliged to 
leave the bishopric. While priests and chaplains were on board the first ships to 
dock in Algiers during the invasion of 1830, the Catholic Church was only officially 
installed in the territory in 1838, with the signing of a papal bull establishing a 
diocese in Algiers. The Church’s arrival in Algeria was celebrated as a reconquest 
of territory that had been Roman and Christian before the spread of Islam across 
North Africa. Dupuch played a central role in propagating the impression of French 
colonialism in Algeria as a historic revival of the spirit of Augustinian Christendom. 
In 1847, two years after his resignation, he published Essai sur l’Algérie chrétienne, 
romaine et française which incorporated long translated excerpts from Africa 
Christiana (1816–17) by the Italian Jesuit scholar and epigraphist Stefano Antonio 
Morcelli. The book summed up Dupuch’s vision of Algeria. The first half was ded-
icated to Morcelli’s account of the ecclesiological geography of Algeria before the 
spread of Islam, while the second half returned to these same sites in the present 
day, incorporating detailed descriptions of each Christian parish and its relevance 
to the ancient Christian history of North Africa.
Relations between the Church and colonial administrators improved sig-
nificantly with the removal of Dupuch and the installation of Louis-Antoine-
Augustin Pavy, who presided over the diocese from 1846 to 1866.26 Pavy was 
more delicate than his predecessor in his dealings with officials in the govern-
ment. His efforts were rewarded as funding for Church building projects meas-
urably increased during his tenure.27 But little advancement was made on the 
issue of the conversion of Algerians as governmental officials in Algeria and Paris 
remained firmly opposed. As one of his biographer explained, on this issue Pavy’s 
“hands were tied.”28
Despite government prohibitions, Pavy was no less committed to evangeli-
zation than was Dupuch, though he employed tactics that were less conspicuous. 
In public, Pavy presented Christianity in much the same way as the government 
had, as a tolerant religion that promoted universal values. But in private channels, 
he maintained that the ultimate goal of the Church remained the conversion of 
Algerians.29 These aims were laid out in the statutes governing the new diocese 
that were distributed to the clergy in Algeria. In the chapter titled “Relations with 
the Infidels” in the 1849 edition of the statutes, Pavy reminded priests to “never 
lose sight of our mission towards the Indigenous and neglect nothing that hastens 
the desired moment of their conversion.”30 Given the government ban on religious 
conversion, Pavy recommended that clergymen spend time “learning Arabic, the 
Koran and the habits and culture of the Indigenous in order to insinuate themselves 
more easily into the inner being (“esprit”) of Algerians and even to show them, on 
occasion, the wrongheaded and immoral nature of their beliefs.”31 Children, Pavy 
continued, should be particular targets of evangelization; he recommended luring 
them into churches and schools where they could be more effectively re-educated.
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While Pavy’s recommendations may have been discreet enough to go unno-
ticed among the general population, some of the tactics employed by other cler-
gymen in Algeria awakened the attention of governmental officials. Such was 
the case with Joseph Girard, appointed by Pavy as Superior General of the Great 
Seminary in Kouba on the outskirts of Algiers. Girard had rounded up a dozen 
impoverished children from the streets of Algiers, bringing them to the seminary 
where he saw to it that they be “gradually initiated … into this true civilization 
that scripture has brought the world.”32 Details of these bold efforts at religious 
conversion were published in l’Atlas, a newspaper out of Oran, leading to an order 
from Paris to dismiss Girard.33
Pavy’s recommendations also emboldened Abbé Loyer, a priest in the Saharan 
town of Laghouat, who published De l’assimilation des arabes in 1866. The book 
was written as a rebuttal of Napoleon III’s project for an “Arab Kingdom” inaugu-
rated during the emperor’s second visit to Algeria the year earlier. If the so-called 
Arab Kingdom policy urged respect for Algerian society and sought coexistence — 
albeit an unequal one — between French settlers and Algerians, Loyer advocated 
for the elimination of Algerian cultural institutions. What was needed to solve the 
“Arab question,” he argued, was a two-pronged strategy: first the destruction of 
“Arab nationality,” to be followed by its reconstitution into French identity. The 
final goal, Loyer explained, was for “the Arab to no longer be what he has been 
and for him to become what he is not yet, that is, French.”34
Loyer recommended a number of tactics, each more devious than the last. 
Brute force, he claimed, had not achieved assimilation, neither had soft-power 
approaches like the creation of the Bureaux Arabes (institutions formed as links 
between the Algerians and the French) and the introduction of the Spahis (French 
military regiments composed of Algerians). Moreover, Loyer criticized the first 
bishop of Algiers for his overt methods of converting Algerians to Catholicism. 
What were needed were “clandestine” means.35 He laid out two such tactics. 
First, he called for members of the clergy to remake themselves into marabouts 
(the Maghrebi term for a Muslim religious leader) in order to penetrate Algerian 
society and gain the trust of tribal members. Second, he proposed that French 
juvenile delinquents and orphans — boys and girls — be embedded, primarily 
through marriage, into Algerian tribal families.
The tactics recommended by Loyer, as those by Pavy before him, all involved 
some form of hybridization, whether through inter-marriage or through the 
deliberate adoption of local language, custom, and dress. The ultimate aim, both 
men made clear, should not be misinterpreted: assimilation was an instrument 
of counter-insurgency and of conquest (“to render insurrections nearly impos-
sible,” Loyer writes) and it entailed the destruction of Algerian culture and not 
the creation of a new, syncretic society.36 For Loyer, the “Arab” needed to be 
“absorbed into us,” “melted,” “melded,” made “submissive,” and “pacified.” 
The most pressing threat to France’s colonial mission, Loyer claimed, was “the 
arabization of the Frenchman;” assimilation was clearly conceived to act in one 
direction only.37
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TRANSFORMING THE KETCHAOUA MOSQUE
If mechanisms of assimilation entailed the destruction of Algerian cultural insti-
tutions, at an urban scale they involved the demolition, conversion, and re- 
signification of buildings, landscapes, and monuments. Saint-Philippe Cathedral 
was the most glaring example of such aims put into practice. At its origin, the 
church was the product of the forcible Christianization of one of the most revered 
Ottoman-era buildings in Algiers, the Ketchaoua Mosque [Figure 5.2]. The con-
version of the building was carried out in a particularly brutal way: at noon on 
December 18, 1832, two years following France’s military conquest of the city, 
Figure 5.2
The interior of the 
Ketchaoua Mosque, 
Algiers. Lithograph 1833. 
Source: Lessore et Wyld, 
Voyage pittoresque dans la 
régence d’Alger, pendant 
l’année 1833 (Paris: Ch. 
Motte, 1835) [Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France].
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French troops stormed the mosque which had been barricaded by 4,000 worship-
pers amassed inside in order to stop its conversion.38 At the time the Ketchaoua 
Mosque was among the most prestigious of Algiers’ religious buildings and stood 
at the center of the city adjacent the former palace of the Ottoman Dey, which 
was now home to the French governor of Algiers. The order to forcibly convert 
the mosque was given by the governor who understood the symbolic importance 
of appropriating the seats of governmental and religious power and acted in 
contravention to a clause in the instrument of Algiers’ surrender that guaranteed 
that Muslims would retain their places of worship. The brazen violation caused 
consternation even among some French officials.39 The Christian cross and the 
Figure 5.3
Plan of the restoration of 
the Cathedral of Saint-
Philippe, with the domed 
interior of the former 
mosque integrated into 
the scheme, Algiers (Pierre-
Auguste Guiauchain). 
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French flag were immediately hoisted up on the building and canons fired from 
a nearby naval flotilla in celebration. The first mass held in the building was cel-
ebrated on Christmas Eve, just a week later, after modest transformations were 
undertaken adding a Christian altar and incorporating a statue of the Virgin Mary 
into the mihrab niche. The church was officially upgraded to cathedral status with 
the creation of the Diocese of Algiers in 1838 and was dedicated to the French 
king, Louis Philippe.
The year following the creation of the diocese, French military administrators, 
in conjunction with religious authorities, embarked on a decades-long process 
Figure 5.4
The Cathedral of 
Saint-Philippe before 
its completion in 1886, 
Algiers. Photograph before 
1886. Source: © InVisu 
(CNRS-INHA).
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of transforming the cathedral in order to accommodate the growing  number of 
 officials, merchants, and colonists settling in Algiers (there were 117,366 Europeans 
in Algeria in 1848). By the end, no visible part of the original mosque building 
remained. Pierre-Auguste Guiauchain, the first of many architects to work on the 
project, presented plans for the reconstruction of the building in 1842, 1843, and 
1848. As drawings of the retrofit show, initial work on the building encapsulated 
(or quite literally swallowed up) the old mosque within a new shell. The architect’s 
intention to salvage the interior of the mosque was clearly rendered in the first 
drawings of the project, as was his aim to provide a new façade that reflected the 
Figure 5.5
Unbuilt scheme for the 
façade of the Cathedral 
of Saint-Philippe, Algiers 
(Romain Harou-Romain). 
Drawing 1856. Source: 
© Ministère de la Culture 
(France), Médiathèque 
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Islamic character of the original mosque and its setting [Figure 5.3]. Construction 
began on the façade, a choir, and the base of a new tower soon after Guiauchain’s 
final design was prepared in 1848 [Figure 5.4].
Following Pavy’s appointment as Bishop of Algiers in 1846, relations with 
the architects, which had been strained under Dupuch, improved significantly as 
Pavy began to play a more prominent role in the process of planning the reno-
vation.40 This, along with important changes in governance in the late 1840s, 
assured the Catholic Church greater control over the design of the cathedral.41 
Indeed, a report on the state of the cathedral in 1853 by the Parisian architect 
Léon Vaudoyer made specific mention of the close collaboration between dioce-
san architects working on the cathedral and Pavy. Vaudoyer singled out a design 
by Romain Harou-Romain, Guiauchain’s successor, as having been produced 
“under the inspiration of the bishop” [Figure 5.5].42 The drawing bears the marks 
of the bishop’s admiration. “It is with the rarest satisfaction that I have seen and 
studied the drawing of the façade planned for my cathedral” is scrawled next to 
the signature of Pavy.43
The design reworked Guiauchain’s façade, with its subdued incorporation 
of local forms, into a frenzied mergence of elements drawn from Islamic and 
Christian architectural traditions. Stone surfaces were rendered into intricate 
geometric latticework that evoked Byzantine and Moorish patterns, corbels were 
remodeled into muqarnas, and multifoil arches recalling archways in the Córdoba 
Mosque (a fitting image given the building’s conversion during the Iberian 
reconquista) were introduced above the entrance portico. A bishop’s balcony 
was added at the center of the composition, flanked by representations of Saint 
Augustine, the fourth century Christian theologian and bishop of Hippo Regius 
(Bône until 1962, now Annaba), and Cyprian, a third century Berber convert and 
Bishop of Carthage.
If the composite nature of the scheme might seem to gesture towards the 
reconciliation of the two central religions in colonial Algeria, it is more likely that 
it reflected Pavy’s assimilationist ideals that proposed employing the outward 
expressions of Algerian culture as a clandestine measure to destroy Algerian reli-
gious identity. Indeed, while the scheme was never realized — and Guiauchain’s 
façade remained unchanged until 1886 — the architects who replaced Harou-
Romain continued the strategy of intermixing Christian and Islamic elements, albeit 
in a less ostentatious way. Under Jean-Baptiste-Pierre-Honoré Féraud, starting in 
1852, the last traces of the mosque were demolished, including the impressive 
octagonal dome and the surrounding marble columns and cupolas, and replaced 
with a barrel vault. Under Jean-Eugène Fromageau some years later, a dome was 
erected over the new choir and a crypt installed beneath [Figure 5.6]. The destruc-
tion of the Ketchaoua Mosque was followed by the building’s reconstitution in 
a hybridized form. The dissonant effect produced by the juxtaposition of Islamic 
architectural elements topped with Christian religious symbols was not accidental, 
for it aimed to break the cultural association between the form of the building 
and its spiritual function in Islamic and Algerian society; in other words it aimed 
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to make clear to onlookers that the French held ultimate mastery and control over 
the culture of the colonized.
The particular way in which the two architectonic vocabularies were con-
joined likewise expressed French supremacy over its Muslim colonial subjects. 
The architects of the cathedral reconfigured the prevailing narratives that saw the 
Romanesque and the Gothic as emerging from Islamic building traditions in such 
a way as to make the Romanesque appear as the progenitor of Islamic architec-
ture. This is most clear in the way that the Romanesque buttresses that line the 
lateral wall of the church quite literally support the Islamic cupolas [Figure 5.7]. 
The subtle misconstrual reinforced conventional European ideas regarding Arab 
architecture that characterized it as excelling in decoration, but as indifferent to 
structural expression. These orientalist assumptions reflected more widespread 
prejudices that saw the West as masculine and rational and the “Orient” as 
 feminine and passive.
Situated between the Casbah and the port, in an area subjected to major 
building and demolitions, the cathedral presented a dramatic contrast to the aus-
tere neoclassicist buildings rising up in parallel formation around it. Indeed, in the 
first decades of the colonial occupation, there were no imposing Christian build-
ings and the few places of Christian worship that did exist in Algiers were housed 
in repurposed buildings without notable exterior expression. The absence of vis-
ible markers of Christianity in the city concerned Church leaders who believed 
that, if native Algerians lacked respect for their colonizers, it was because they 
perceived them to be insufficiently religious. They cited, for example, the criti-
cisms of Emir Abd-el-Kader, the Algerian religious and military leader who led 
a rebellion against the French occupation. “Your religion? But you do not have 
a religion,” Abd-el-Kader reportedly exclaimed during the signing of the Tafna 
Treaty in 1837, adding that “if you were Christians as you pretend to be, you would 
have priests, churches, and we would be the best of friends.”44 The renovation 
of Saint-Philippe Cathedral was thus envisioned as a monumental expression of 
Catholicism’s importance in the life of the colonizers and as a definitive statement 
Figure 5.6
Planned alterations to the 
Cathedral of Saint-Philippe 
from 1838 to 1857, 
Algiers (Jean-Eugène 
Fromageau). Drawings 
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of the Church’s renewed presence in North Africa. It operated as a piece of 
 architectural  seduction,  aggrandizing the Church’s presence in Algiers in order to 
gain the respect of Algerians, while “indigenizing” Christianity within foreign soil.
POSTCOLONIAL REAPPROPRIATION OF THE KETCHAOUA MOSQUE
The cathedral remained much the same way as it was in the nineteenth century 
when on July 5, 1962, the day of Algerian independence from France, a group 
of 800 men and women rushed inside and reclaimed it as the central mosque 
of the city. The Ketchaoua Mosque officially reopened on the anniversary of the 
outbreak of the Algerian Revolution a few months later.45 While the building was 
entirely transformed since it last served Algerian worshippers, the towers, horse-
shoe arches, geometric tile work and countless other details from Islamic building 
traditions made for a natural fit for revived Muslim prayer.
The mosque has suffered damage from earthquakes and neglect in recent 
years, forcing its closure in 2006. The building reopened in April 2018, upon the 
conclusion of a four-year restoration project funded by the government of Turkey 
[Figure 5.8]. If the cathedral functioned as something of a monument to inde-
pendence following its reconversion in 1962, that status has been complicated 
given the Turkish imprimatur on the recently renovated building. Indeed, French 
Figure 5.7
The lateral façade 
of the Cathedral of 
Saint-Philippe, Algiers 
(Jean-Eugène Fromageau). 
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settler colonialism replaced Ottoman rule over Algiers in 1830 and, before its 
 demolition and reconstruction by French architects, the Ketchaoua Mosque was 
an architectural relic of the Ottoman period. Beyond the altruistic motivations that 
may inform Turkey’s largesse, the gesture seeks to summon the city’s distant past 
as the Ottoman Regency of Algiers while ensuring the maintenance of Turkish 
national and religious power across the Muslim world.46
Most recently, the Ketchaoua Mosque has re-entered public consciousness 
in the wake of the debates regarding Islamic spaces of worship in France. Critics of 
the “Touche pas à mon église” movement have seen the building, and its double 
conversion from a mosque to a church and back into a mosque, as presenting 
an instructive parallel to the recent polemic.47 If today the suggestion to convert 
certain disused churches into mosques in a consensual manner has ignited public 
opinion, the indignation is at best disingenuous given the forcible conversions that 
haunt French colonial history. Indeed, the conversion of religious buildings was 
a key instrument of colonial domination during the initial decades of the French 
conquest of Algeria. Assimilation, as a tactic employed by the Catholic Church in 
Algeria in the nineteenth century, entailed nothing less than the destruction of 
Muslim cultural and religious institutions and the re-signification of its urban fabric 
and identity. While the return to notions of assimilation in recent years may bear 
Figure 5.8
The Ketchaoua Mosque 
during the 2014–18 
restoration funded by 
the Turkish government, 
Algiers. Photograph 2017. 
Source: Daniel E. Coslett.
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little in common with the violence endured by Algerians before independence, 
for Muslim minorities in France, the current hostility toward the consensual con-
version of certain empty churches into mosques is part of the continued struggle 
for visibility. From the standpoint of multiculturalism, it is unjustified to see recent 
mosque building and suggestions of church conversions as evidence of Muslim 
rejection of French identity, and at worst, as a ploy to subvert the founding prin-
ciples of Western civilization. Rather, the gradual increases in places of Muslim 
worship should be seen as a positive endeavor and as a manifestation of the desire 
of once colonized and displaced populations to establish themselves in France and 
express themselves more openly in the civic sphere.
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